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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PERRY MESSICK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
PHD TRUCKING SERVICE, INC., Supreme Court No. 16605 
De fendan t-Responden t. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to compel the lessee to account for 
payments due to lessor under a truck leasing agreement and for 
judgment for the amount owing the lessor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on April 19, 1979, before Judge 
Sorensen in the District Court of Utah County. The Court 
found that the parties had reached an accord and satisfac-
tion on October 22, 1976, and entered judgment for the 
defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant prays that this Court reverse the 
findings of the trial court and award judgment for the 
plaintiff in accordance with his proposed findings of fact. 
In the alternative, it is prayed that this Court will find 
that the rlisputed lease agreements are valid and enforceable 
again st the rle fend ant and remand the case for a new trial on 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Perry Messick, was the owner of a 1963 
Kenworth truck. He had bought this truck on December 7, 
1973, from Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt for $10,000. He paid 
$2,000 down and gave a note for the balance to Davies and 
Hiatt. Davies and Hiatt are the owners and principal officers 
of PHO Trucking. ( R. 89, 183). 
On January 1, 1974, the plaintiff entered into a lease 
agreement with the defendant, PHO Trucking. (R.95, 124) The 
terms of the lease were that PHO would pay to the plaintiff 
$. 32 per mile for the use of the truck and $.10 per mile for 
the driver of the truck. (R.115, Ex. 3,4). 
Over the next two years and three months, plaintiff's 
truck was driven on hauling assignments for the defendant. 
It was plaintiff's belief that the terms of the lease were 
in effect throughout this period. (R.124). The lease expired 
on July 1, 1974, and the parties signed another identical 
agreement on November 22, 1974. ( R. 12 6) • In this four and 
one-half month interval, the defendant continued to use the 
plaintiff's truck and the parties understood that the terms 
of the lease governed their relationship. ( R. 206-207). 
It was arranged between the parties that payments which 
became due to the plaintiff would be retained by the defendant 
ano credited tow a rd the amount that he owed to Mr. Davies 
and Mr. Hiatt on the truck. (R.93, 100). 
-2-
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In January of 1975, the plaintiff began inquiries as to 
how much he still owed on the truck. Mr. Davies told him 
that it was almost paid for. ( R.126). In May of 1975, 
thinking that his truck had been paid off, the plaintiff 
ceased hauling for the defendant and leased his truck out to 
other companies. (R.126). Throughout this period and into 
t~ Fall of 1976, the plaintiff made numerous requests that 
the defendant account to him for the monies it had retained. 
(R.126, 128). The plaintiff received no accounting for the 
amount owing him under the lease. In early October, 1976, 
~wever, he was informed that he still owed $9,800.00 on the 
true k. (R.130). Approximately one week later, the plaintiff 
offered to sell his truck back to Davies and Hiatt. On 
~tober 22, 1976, the plaintiff re-conveyed all of his 
interest in the truck for $1,586.03. ( R. 13 0 Ex • 7 ) • 
The plaintiff refused to accept the figures given to 
him concerning ton haulage payments and this lawsuit ensued. 
M trial, the defendant's employees, Mr. Davies and Mr. 
Hiatt, testified that they never intended to pay plaintiff 
~der the terms of the lease. (R.115-116, 169). They claimed 
that the parties had agreed that payment would be made on a 
'tonnage rate per trip' basis, and that the lease agreement 
was executed only to convince the Public Service Commission 
that the plain ti ff was operating under defendant's Certificate 
of Convenience. (R.95-96, 186). This testimony was admitted 
1
·1er plaintiff's objection that it was parol evidence 
·1·1 ill•] ln vary lhe terms of a writing. (R.205). The 
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defendant's accounting to the plaintiff used the tonnage per 
trip rate rather than the rate spelled out in the lease 
agreement. (Ex. 5 & 6). As a result of this, a much lower 
sum of money was credited to the plaintiff's account and the 
defendant's books showed that the truck had run a deficit. 
(R.101). The plaintiff is now seeking the difference between 
what he was actually paid and the amount that he should have 
been paid pursuant to the lease. The calculation of this 
amount is shown in Exhibit 30. 
The Court entered judgment for the defendant on the 
ground that the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction 
on October 22, 1976, by the reconveyance of the plaintiff's 
truck to Mr. Davies and Mr. Hiatt. The plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial was denied and this appeal ensued. 
ARGUMENT 
POI!JT I 
THE WRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE MODIFIED BY PAROL 
EVIDENCE. 
The defendant drafted the leases in question (Exhibits 
and 4) and persuaded the plaintiff to execute them by 
telling him that he could not lawfully drive for them 
without such a lease agreement. At trial, over plaintiff's 
objection (R.205), defendant introduced testimony that it 
did not intend to be bound by the terms of the lease which 
required it to pay plaintiff thirty-two cents ( $. 32) per 
mile for the truck and ten cents ( $ .10) per mile for the 
driver. ( R. 11 S-116, 169). Such testimony is inadmissible as 
,, Ji ''vidence citt;'mpting to vary the plain, unambiguous 
-4-
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l 
the parties· The Oregon Supreme Court announced this rule 
in Kergil v. Central Oregon Fir Supply Company, 323 P. 2d 947 
(Or., 1958), a case identical to the present action. 
In Kergil, a truck owner executed a written agreement 
leasing his truck to the defendant for the purpose of hauling 
lumber. The defendant paid the plaintiff some money but it 
was less than the amount stated in the lease. 
At trial the defendant admitted the execution of the 
lease but said that it was a pretend agreement entered only 
so that it could be filed with the Public Service Commission 
to receive a favorable tax treatment. The defendant said 
that the true agreement was that plaintiff would be paid a 
fixed amount per thousand board feet hauled. 
The Court held that such testimony was inadmissable parol 
evidence attempting to vary the terms of a writing. It said: 
Thus, the principal question is: Will the 
law permit consideration of oral evidence 
denying the validity of the written memorial 
of the parties when such oral evidence shows 
the written document was executed for the 
purpose of defrauding or misleading a third 
party? 
The courts are not of a single mind upon 
this issue. We confess, the majority of 
jurisdictions at the present time, based 
upon pure logic, admit the evidence on the 
basis that such testimony is offered, not 
to vary the terms of the written instrument 
within the letter of the parole evidence 
rule, but only to show the parties never 
intended the written instrument to be a 
binding agreement. 
The difficulty with this view is that it 
overlooks the moral aspects of the situation. 
It permits the law to be used to lend its 
aid to those who would mislead or defraud 
third parties without providing any restrain-
ing penalty upon their immoral actions. Of 
tiH' JT:ajcnitv view, the eminent Michigan law 
[>n>f•·c;sor ,John E. Tracy, 33 Michigan Law Review 
411 (1934-34), speaks thus: 
-5-
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'A rule admitting such testimony 
encourages dishonest men in pursuing 
fraudulent practices. If such a man 
knows that he can, to his profit, with 
little risk to himself, deceive his 
neighbor by arranging to have exhibited 
to such neighbor a contract apparently 
binding but legally unenforceable, can 
it not be expected that he will do so? 
Also would it not be equally apparent 
to the layman that a dishonest man, 
faced with certain liability on a con-
tract which he has signed, under such 
a rule could always create for himself 
a chance of avoiding such liability by 
inventing testimony to show that he 
signed the contract only for the pur-
pose of deceiving someone not a party 
to the cause? For, under the rule as 
laid down by the authorities, against 
such testimony, if believed by the jury, 
the court is powerless to do justice, 
however preposterous the court may feel 
it to be.' 
And Professor Wigmore, 9 Wigmore on 
Evidence 16, §2406, states the following: 
'When the document is to serve the 
purpose of a mere sham, this principle 
in strictness exonerates the makers. 
But a just policy would seem to concede 
this only when the pretense is a morally 
justifiable one (as, to calm a lunatic 
or to console a dying person). When it 
is morally beyond sanction, or aims at an 
evasion of the law or a deception of other 
persons, by intention of the parties, that 
intention will not be given effect. Hence 
if the validity of the instrument would 
give effect to such intention (as in usury), 
the instrument will not be enforced; but 
if the invalidity of the instrument would 
give effect to such intention, the instru-
ment will be enforced.' 
Other courts have adopted this 
rule which we believe is the one most 
in conformity with the dictates of 
justice. See Graham v. Savage, 110 
Minn. 510, 126 N.W. 394; Higby v. 
floorer:_, 124 Mont. 331, 221 P.2d 1043; 
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Supreme Lodge Knights of Phythias v. 
Dalzell, 205 Mo.App. 207, 223 S.W. 786; 
Gagnon v. Fleury, 117 Vt. 382, 92 A.2d 
470; Town of Grand Isle v. Kinney, 70 
Vt. 381, 41 A.130. See dissent in Hoss 
v. Purinton, 9 Cir., 229 F.2d 104. ~~ 
Under the facts in this case, the 
trial court erred in admitting testi-
money of another and different oral con-
tract from that expressed by the parties 
in their executed written leases. 
Other cases in support of this rule are Bersani v. 
~neral Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, 36 
N. y. 2d 4 5 7 I 3 6 9 N • y. s • 2d 1 0 8 I 3 3 0 N. E • 2d 6 8 ( N • y. 1 9 7 5 ) ; 
Schnabel v. Vaughn, 140 N.W.2d 168 (Ia. 1966); Meyer v. 
Weber, 109 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.1937). 
The defendant should not be allowed to escape liability 
on contracts that it drafts by claiming that the true purpose 
of the contract was to defraud a government agency. Such a 
result would encourage the defendant to continue its illegal 
conduct. Indeed, the defendant has indicated that such 
conduct is already its standard operating procedure. (R.186). 
i'lithout the parol evidence of the defendent accepted by the 
court, the proof offered by the plaintiff would have been 
unclisputed and irrefutable. 
POINT I I 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ALTERED 
BY THE DEFENDANT'S SUBJECTIVE INTENTIONS. 
While the intent of the parties to a contract is deter-
minative of its meaning, it is fundamental that only objective 
:,anifestations of intent will effect the interpretation. 
unsp"ken or subiective intents of the parties have no 
11 '' 1 un tlw1r aqrf"ement. This is stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d, 
Jtittcicts §245: 
-7-
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It is not necessarily the real 
intent, but the expressed or appar-
ent intent, which is sought. The 
court will not attempt to ascertain 
the actual mental processes of the 
parties in entering into the parti-
cular contract; rather the law pre-
sumes that the parties understood 
the import of their contract and that 
they had the intention which its 
terms manifest. 
In Clyde v. Eddington Canning Company, 10 Utah 2d 14, 
347 P.2d 563 (1959), the defendant had signed an instrument 
in which he personally guaranteed payment for goods his 
corporation bought from the plaintiff. The defendant later 
sought to avoid personal liability by claiming that it was 
not his intention to be bound in his personal capacity. 
This court sustained a summary judgment for the plaintiff 
stating that "under the clear language of the writing we are 
not impressed with such contention, particularly since 
intentions cannot vary the terms of clear, concise, unambi-
guous language employed by him who says he did not intend 
what he said." 
The objective manifestations made to plaintiff were 
that the plaintiff would receive thirty-two cents ($.32) per 
mile for the lease of his truck and ten cents ($.10) per 
mile for its driver. They were made when the defendant's 
employees approached plaintiff, told him that he needed a 
lease agreement to legally work for them and presented to 
him an il<Jreement which they had prepared and which stated 
tl,at h0 woulcl receive the said amounts. At the time the 
,1-10; ,~xc>cutc>cl, Mr. Davies and Mr. Hiatt did not tell 
-8-
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plaintiff that they intended the lease to be a sham. Mr. Hiatt 
stated that he relied on previous discussions with plaintiff 
to make their intention clear (R.168, line 3, page 170, line 
18). It was certainly reasonable for the plaintiff to 
understand that the lease presented to him was meant to be 
valid and not an attempt to circumvent the law. It was the 
defendant's burden to make such an intention absolutely 
clear and in failing to do so it must be bound by the words 
it wrote as they would be reasonably understood. 
POINT III 
THE CREATOR OF AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO ENFORCE IT OR TO PROFIT FROM ITS TERMS. 
The defendant asserts that the true contract between 
the parties was a tonnage per trip rate of payment. Such a 
contract is illegal because plaintiff cannot operate under 
defendant's Certificate of Convenience under any method of 
payment except leasing. Thus if defendant argues that the 
leases are a sham he is also arguing that the "true" contract 
is illegal. 
Generally, the court will extend no relief to the 
parties of an illegal contract, however, when the parties 
are not in pari delicto the courts will give relief to the 
innocent or less guilty party by either enforcing the contract 
or by giving the value of any services rendered. The law is 
stated in "Contracts," 17 Am.Jur.2d §227, 607: 
Where the one party is the principal 
offender and the other criminal only 
from a constrained acquiescence in the 
illegal conduct, in such cases there is 
no parity of delictum at all between 
the parties, and the one protected by 
law or acting under compulsion may, at 
any time, resort to the law to recover. 
-9-
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The case law in Utah and other states is in accord. 
In Gorringe vs. Read, 23 Utah 120, 63 P. 902 (1901) this 
court stated: 
It is no doubt true, as a general 
proposition that a court of equity ..• 
will not interpose to aid parties who 
are concerned in unlawful transactions 
or agreements; but where public policy 
requires relief to be given, and when 
the parties, though in delicto, are 
not in pari delicto, - as when, at the 
time-Of the transaction, the complain-
ant was under undue influence, hard-
ship, or oppression, or great in-
equality of condition or age existed, 
and acted involuntarily, - the maximum 
does not apply. The reason is that in 
such cases the public interests and 
justice require relief to be given, 
even though the complaint be by one 
who is particeps criminis. 
The Oregon Supreme Court rendered a similar holding in 
Oregon & Western Colonization Company v. Johnson, 102 P. 2d 
928 (Oregon 1940). It said: 
Where the parties to an illegal 
bargain though both blameworthy, are 
not in pari delicto, and one of them 
has not been guilty of serious moral 
turpitude, he can repudiate the bar-
gain and if he has rendered any per-
formance thereunder recover it or its 
value. 
Finally, in Redke v. Silver Trust, 98 Cal.Rptr.293, 490 
P.2d 805 (1971), the California Supreme Court stated that: 
A bargain may be illegal by 
reason of the wrongful purpose 
of one or both of the parties making 
it. This is true even though the 
performances bargained for are not 
in themselves illegal and even though 
-10-
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in the absence of the illegal pur-
pose the bargain would be valid and 
enforceable. The party that makes 
such a bargain in furtherance of his 
wrongful purpose cannot enforce it, 
even though it is enforceable against 
him by the other party if the latter 
is innocent of such a purpose. (Emphasis 
in original). 
The plaintiff is not in pari delicto in regards to the 
illegal tonnage contract. He understood that he was operating 
legally under valid leases, (R.124). He was unaware that PHD 
was paying him under an illegal contract. ( R.125, 131). The 
defendant should be estopped from asserting such an illegal 
contract and should be required to pay the plaintiff the amount 
manifested in the leases, such sum being the reasonable value 
of plaintiffs services. 
Even if the parties were in pari delicto, public policy 
dictates that the defendant should be required to live up to 
rates promised in the leases. Otherwise the defendant will 
profit from his illegal scheme and will have incentive to 
repeat it. In Local Federal Savings and Loan Association v. 
Sheets, 130 P. 2d 825 (Okla. 1942) the Court said that "when 
public policy demands the granting of relief, the same will 
be afforded regardless of the illegality of the transaction 
1·1ith which it is connected." 
POINT IV 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OR THE LAW. 
A. Standard of Review. This is an action for an 
occountinq in equity. The nature of an equitable accounting 
1
. ~11 I 111 /\c1·oLmts and Accounting, 1 Am.Jur.2d §52, page 
-11-
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Courts of equity have jurisdiction 
to state and settle accounts, or to compel 
an accounting, where a fiduciary relation-
ship exists between the parties and duty 
rests upon the defendant to render an 
account. This right exists not only in 
the case where those relationships which 
are traditionally regarded as those of 
trust and confidence, but also in those 
informal relations which exist whenever 
one person trusts in and relies upon an-
other. The relationship between an em-
ployer and employee, between parties to 
a business agreement, and between an 
officer of a school board and school 
district, have all been held to involve 
such confidence and trust as to 
entitle one of the parties to an 
accounting in equity. (Emphasis added). 
The plaintiff had entrusted the defendant with much of 
the money that his truck had earned so that it could be 
~plied to the debt that he owed for the purchase of the 
truck. This suit is to determine how much the defendant was 
obligated to credit to the plaintiff's account. As such, it 
comes under the above description of an equitable accounting. 
This court is not bound by the findings of fact of the 
trial court in equity cases. Rather, it must conduct an 
independant evaluation of the evidence in the record. This 
was stated in First Security Bank of Utah v. Demir is, 10 
Utah 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 97 (1960). 
It is our prerogative and duty 
under the constitution to review the 
evidence in equity cases and to modify 
or make new findings if the record 
compels it. 
B. The Evidence Compels a Reversal of the Trial Court's 
~· The findings of fact made by the trial court had 
i)asis in the record. It found in Finding of Fact #11 
iR.4G, 32) that the parties had entered a settlement agreement 
-12-
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~ich constituted an accord and satisfaction on September 
22, 1976, and that such settlement agreement was shown by 
Exhibit 7. An examination of this exhibit gives no indica-
tion that the parties intended it to settle all of their 
claims against each other. It is merely a document in which 
t~ plaintiff conveyed the ownership of his truck back to 
Hr. Davies and Mr. Hiatt in exchange for $1, 526. 03. The 
plaintiff released nothing other than the ownership in his 
truck. In support of this, Mr. Davies stated (R.185) that 
at the time Exhibit 7 was executed, there was no discussion 
~tween the parties regarding any other monies owed to the 
plaintiff by the defendant. As further evidence of the 
casual treatment of the testimony and exhibits, the Court 
found that the Exhibit had been executed on September 22, 
when the evidence demonstrated it had actually been executed 
on October 22. (R.102, Ex.7). 
In Court Finding 7, (R.32) the Court found that neither 
of the parties kept a record of the mileage driven by the 
plaintiff for the defendant. This is plainly incorrect. 
~hibit 29 shows that the plaintiff did keep mileage records. 
The defendant did not keep such records but made an estimate 
of mileage in preparation of trial and offered an exhibit 
~~d upon a reconstruction of its haulage records. (R.202-
103, 212-213, Ex.16). Further, Court Finding 8, based upon 
'.he defendant's reconstructed mileage records found that 
,Jaintiff had driven 105,474 miles for the defendant. This 
'''lLadicts the finding that no mileage records had been 
Ppl · ( R. 31) • 
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In Finding 4, the Court found that the parties had 
executed the leases in question. In Finding 5, it found 
that the leases were merely used to meet the Public Service 
Commission requirements. The Court erred as a matter of law 
in fa i 1 ing to en force the terms of those agreements. There 
ws no lawful evidence upon which the court could base 
Finding 5. The testimony of the defendant that it did not 
intend the leases to be valid was inadmissible as parol 
evidence (See discussion in Point I). 
Even if defendant's testimony was lawfully admitted, 
the court was obligated to find for the plaintiff. When a 
court is confronted with two possible constructions of a 
contract, one of them rendering the contract legal and one 
of them rendering the contract illegal, it is the duty of 
the court to choose the lawful of the two possible construe-
tions. This was stated by this court in Schofield v. Zions 
Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 39 P. 2d 342 (Utah 1934). 
A construction giving an instrument 
a legal effect to accomplish its purpose 
will be adopted when it can reasonably 
be done, and between two possible con-
structions that will be adopted which 
establishes a valid contract. 
This rule was also followed by the California Supreme 
Court in Redke v. Silver Trust, supra. 
As a general rule, if a contract can be per-
formed legally, a court will presume that 
the parties intended a lawful mode of per-
formance. 
The defendant's construction of the leases is that they 
~re a sham and the plaintiff's construction is that they 
''' val id and en forcenble. Under the above rule, the court 
ncquirecl to choose the rlaintiff 's construction. 
-14-
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I 
l 
C. There was not and could not be an accord and satisfac-
tion on October 22, 1976. Supplementing the arguement made 
under B above, there cannot be an accord because there is no 
evidence that anyone intended the settlement of October 22, 
1976 (Ex. 7) to apply to anything other than the truck. An 
accord is reached only when a clear unambiguous offer of 
compromise is accepted by the creditor. The general view of 
the law is stated in 1 AmJur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction 
§14, 312. 
To constitute an accord and satisfaction 
in law dependent upon the offer of the 
payment of money, the offer of money must 
be made in full satisfaction of the de-
mand or claim of the creditor and be 
accompanied by such acts or declarations 
as amount to a cond1t1on that if the 
money is accepted, it is to be in full 
satisfaction, and it must be of such a 
character that the creditor is bound so 
to understand the offer. The debtor is 
not required to use any set language in 
making his offer of full settlement, as 
long as he makes it clear that acceptance 
of what he tenders must be in full satis-
faction. (Emphasis added). 
In Coover v. G&J Electric, Inc., 285 Or. 247, 590 P.2 
720 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court held that no accord is 
reached unless "such intention shall be made known to the 
creditor in some unmistakable manner." 
There is absolutely no evidence which shows that defendant 
clearly offered the $1,586.03 payment in satisfaction of all 
claims and that plaintiff understood this and accepted such 
offer. T\s was stated in Part B above, Mr. Davies, the only 
witness for the defendant, testified that no other debts 
11 ,:·11';c;c:d at the time of the transaction. ( R.185). 
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Further, at the time Exhibit 7 was executed, the plain-
tiff was making no demand for payments under the lease. 
He ente>red the transaction with Hiatt and Davies, not PHD 
Trucking, seeking only to sell an apparently unprofitable 
truck. Any money he received was consideration for the 
truck only, not for the compromise of any claims against the 
defendant. 
Finally, the defendant cannot claim accord and satisfac-
tion under Exhibit 7 because it was not a party to that 
agreement. The exhibit shows that plaintiff conveyed his 
truck to Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt in their individual 
capacities. PHD Trucking Services Inc. was not mentioned 
and there is no indication in the document or other evidence 
that Davies and Hiatt were acting as representatives of the 
oorporation or that they were treating the corporation as an 
alter ego. 
Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of an accord and 
satisfaction and this Court is obligated to reverse the 
findings of the court below. 
POI!JT V 
THE PLArnTIFF-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDAt<T-RESPONDENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $12, 833. 75. 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the defendant is 
indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $12, 833. 75. The 
Plaintiff submitted proposed findings, conclusions and judg-
ment accordinCJly. ( R. 33-37) 
Tlw Frni Lty of the Clefendant's suggested arithmetic is 
'"i•'c\yrJ 111 its handling of charges to the plaintiff's 
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account. On its accounting it charged the plaintiff with 
$2,226.66 in diesel repairs that were never made and 
explained such peculiar accounting by saying that these 
charges were really payroll charges to one of its drivers. 
(R.176-178, 138; Ex. 25, 23, 24). 
Defendant, when it acted as broker for plaintiff's truck, 
also failed to give plaintiff full credit for amounts it 
received on plaintiff's behalf for hauling done for another 
company, Clark Tank Lines. The amount of this shortage was 
$646. 94. ( R.127, 156; Ex. 25, 29). 
The amount of defendant's indebtedness to plaintiff is 
calculated in Exhibit 30. (Line 5 of exhibit 30 is arith-
metically incorrect and should read $12,833.75). The mileage 
figure of 109,409 was calculated in Exhibit 29 which is a 
compilation of plaintiff's records from the period he drove 
for defendant. This figure should be taken as correct in 
view of the fact that defendant admitted that it kept no 
mileage records of its own. ( R. 212-213). The expense figure 
in Exhibit 30 was calculated by the defendant in Exhibit 18. 
When the defendant's parol evidence is excluded the 
evidence of the defendant's indebtedness according to 
plaintiff's calculation is overwhelming. Since this is 
an equity case this Court is empowered to examine the facts 
to determine the amount of the indebtedness. An examination 
of the testimony and exhibits will show that the sum sought 
bv plaintiff is supported by reliable, clear and convincing 
'l_,l ·'I I\.._'(';' • 
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CONCLUSION 
The parties entered into a valid agreement and the 
plaintiff is now seeking to enforce that agreement and 
require the defendant to account to him for monies due. The 
defendant should be estopped from pleading its fraudulent 
scheme in order to avoid its obligations, under considera-
tions of public policy, equity, and the parol evidence rule. 
It is requested that this Court reverse the findings of the 
trial court and adopt the proposed findings of the plaintiff. 
In the alternative the plaintiff asks that this Court declare 
the lease agreements to be enforceable and remand the case 
for a new trial on the issue of damages. ~' Respectfully submitted this ~'}---day of October, 1979. 
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